JERUSALEM – In the second week of the war in Gaza, with Israeli
ground troops poised to intensify their actions against Hamas
militants, weapons’ stores and rocket-launching sites, diplomatic
efforts to end the fighting gathered pace.

Israeli analysts said that although the Hamas military
infrastructure has been dealt a devastating blow, the organization’s
fighting force remains largely intact. One of the goals of the Israeli
ground operation is to hit the militia’s fighters hard, which could
entail tough house-to-house combat.

The militiamen have taken up positions in built-up areas in densely
populated towns and refugee camps, and confronting them in those
conditions could be very risky for Israeli soldiers and Palestinian
civilians.

Nevertheless, Israel’s military planners say they are determined to
break Hamas as a fighting force by engaging the militiamen in close
combat. In the limited fighting so far, ground forces say they have
killed dozens of militiamen and taken dozens more prisoner.

The possibility of serious escalation, however, brought French
President Nicolas Sarkozy and three European foreign ministers to
Jerusalem in an effort to bring the fighting in Gaza to an end. Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni indicated Israel’s readiness to end the war, but
only if its exit demands were met. Otherwise it would ratchet up its
already intense military pressure on Hamas.

The Israeli dilemma is how to create conditions on the ground that
guarantee security for southern Israel without granting Hamas a measure
of international legitimacy. The Israelis have been warning against a
scenario in which a defeated Hamas makes enormous political gains
merely by being treated by the international community as a full
partner in cease-fire negotiations.

This, they argue, is totally unacceptable, for two main reasons:
Hamas gained power through a violent coup in June 2007 and is dedicated
to Israel’s destruction. The Israelis are therefore seeking a new
international "arrangement" that would address all their security
concerns, as well as the issue of border crossings to and from Gaza,
without Hamas having any say in the negotiating process.

In other words, Israel is not interested in returning to the old
formula of third-party mediation for a cease-fire, or "tadiyeh," a
process that would give Hamas a degree of international recognition.

In their contacts with the Americans and Europeans, Israeli leaders
have outlined three key elements they would like to see included in the
new arrangements: a credible cease-fire to end rocket fire on Israeli
civilians, an internationally supervised mechanism to prevent Hamas
rearming, and joint European Union, Egyptian and Palestinian Authority
supervision at border crossing points.

To deter Hamas from firing more rockets after a cease-fire is
achieved, Israel wants to have its right to retaliate written into the
cease-fire terms.

The biggest headache for the Israelis is the possibility of Hamas
rebuilding and even enhancing its rocket-firing capabilities by
smuggling new and longer-range weapons across the border with Egypt
under cover of a cease-fire.

Israel is therefore demanding that the new arrangements on the
ground include collapsing all the smuggling tunnels under the
Philadelphi route along the Gaza-Egypt border; erecting a physical
barrier on the Egyptian side of the border that would make smuggling
virtually impossible; deploying an international force in the buffer
zone between Egypt and Gaza; and securing a commitment from Egypt to
stop the flow of arms into Sinai, from where they find their way to the
Gaza border.

Hamas’ main demand before and during the fighting has been that
Israel allow the opening of all crossing points in and out of Gaza.
Israel says it is prepared to do so, on the basis of a 2005 agreement
under which the crossings would be supervised jointly by Israel, the
Palestinian Authority (not Hamas), Egypt and the European Union. This
is also the Egyptian position with regard to the Rafah crossing point
from Gaza into Egypt.

One of the difficulties with the uncompromising Israeli position
against talking to Hamas is the way it complicates chances for the
return of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israeli leaders say
they would like to see Shalit’s return as part of the overall
cease-fire arrangement, but it is hard to see how this could be
accomplished without a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas.

The Americans and Europeans are split in their approach to the Israeli cease-fire terms.

The Americans say a cease-fire should only be put in place when
conditions exist for it to be stable and lasting. In other words, only
after something like the new border reality Israel envisages can be
established.

The Europeans, however, say a cease-fire should go into effect
immediately. After talks with Livni in Jerusalem, the foreign ministers
of the Czech Republic — the current holder of the EU’s rotating
presidency — France and Sweden made it clear they were against waiting
until all Israel’s war aims are achieved. They say these aims could be
secured more easily once a cease-fire is in place.

So where the Americans and Israelis are saying new reality first,
then cease-fire, the Europeans are saying the opposite: cease-fire
first, then new reality.

In a briefing Sunday to the Cabinet, Shin Bet security agency chief
Yuval Diskin said Hamas was ready for a cease-fire now, as long it did
not feel humiliated by its terms. Military intelligence head Maj.-Gen.
Amos Yadlin said Hamas leaders now understand that their ending of the
previous cease-fire with Israel on Dec. 19 had been a major strategic
blunder.

Hamas was surprised not only by the scope of Israel’s retaliation,
but also by the depth of anti-Hamas feeling among moderate Arab
leaders, especially in Egypt.

Egyptian leaders, including President Hosni Mubarak and Foreign
Minister Ahmad Aboul Gheit, insisted that Hamas had brought the Gaza
tragedy on itself by not heeding their advice to extend the cease-fire
with Israel. Lawmaker Mohammed Basouni bluntly accused Hamas leaders of
hiding in underground bunkers and deserting their people in their hour
of need.

The Egyptians have strong regional and domestic reasons for their
opposition to Hamas. They see Iran as their most dangerous regional
foe, and Gaza controlled by Hamas as a forward Iranian base on their
doorstep. They also fear the ideological connection between Hamas and
the seditious opposition Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt. And they realize
that the border tunnels could support terror and violence in the
opposite direction — from Gaza into Egypt.

Israel and Egypt thus have a common interest in weakening Hamas and moderating Iranian influence in Gaza.

Whether they can find a common and effective diplomatic formula to
change the reality on the ground — together with other key
international players — ultimately is what the Israeli military
campaign is all about.